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The Honorable Paul Michelt
INTRODUCTION
I am going to discuss two tracks. The first will be directed to
some of the observations made by others in articles and comments.
The second track will concern the internal workings of our court.
An understanding of the court's operations in some detail may help
provide a more useful interpretation of the opinions and a broader
understanding of the strengths and limitations of our court as an
institution. All of the things I will mention about how the court
works are relevant to both individual practices and as further
background against which to assess the comments made in this
Symposium. I
My flight to Cleveland to participate in the Symposium was
slow. It was supposed to arrive at 6:30 p.m. Due to bad weather,
it did not arrive until 10:30 p.m. The flight provides a kind of im-
agery that may be of some use in understanding why I think this
Symposium is so valuable, why I am so pleased with who the other
authors and commentators are, and why I am so pleased with the
interesting and diverse audience of practitioners and students cap-
tivated by this topic.
Pilots ordinarily fly under strict instruction. In a certain man-
ner of speaking, the air traffic controller is really flying the air-
plane. The pilot does not move one degree or one thousand feet in
any direction without a specific command from the air traffic con-
Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
I can only tell you what I do. In everything I set forth in this discussion, I am speaking
only as one judge, because I want to be as candid and direct as I can. What I write here is not
necessarily the view of my court as an institution, or of any other judge on the court, or judges
on other courts. This is my perspective.
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troller. That is the norm. There is something else called "pilot
discretion," in which the pilot has broad leeway within certain lim-
its. Within that context, it is very, very important for the pilot to
understand where she is. Therefore, the importance of the naviga-
tional aids and beacons is very great.
What does that have to do with the topic at hand? Our court,
along with all courts, is enriched through actions, commentary,
and even complaints, of people who carefully watch what we do.
There really are three broad categories of such people: practitio-
ners, academics, and other judges. Through this Symposium, I
have had the benefit of analyzing observations from multiple peo-
ple from each of those groups. These observations are helpful
beacons. They are not instructions in that I do not have to do eve-
rything that Mark Lemley, for example, says;2 but I am pleased to
listen to Mark and other academics. I always learn things, and
such comments improve our navigational ability, quite apart from
what the specific reaction might be to any particular proposal.
I. REVIEW BY THE CAFC
The announced topic is "The Past, Present, and Future of the
Federal Circuit." Actually, I am not going to discuss the past. I
am not going to discuss the present, either. And to be completely
honest, I do not know about the future. I promised to discuss the
internal operations, which I will.
I will start by reminding the reader about the method used
when anyone seeks to understand trends, evolution, or rules, seeks
to make predictions, or seeks to perform analysis that will work for
the various purposes of practitioners, academics or others. There
are certain cautions we should observe. First, pursuant to stare
decisis, statements in judicial opinions that are essentially dicta
have no precedential force on future panels. Such language must
be distinguished (as professors encourage us in the very first
weeks of first year law school). There is an important distinction
between what is clearly the holding and what is clearly dicta, al-
though admittedly there is a fair amount of stuff that is somewhere
on the spectrum between those extremes. At least the extremes are
clear.
Second, in our opinions, the standard of review makes a big
difference on many issues. When the court seems to be leaning
this way or that way, you have to take into account how much lee-
way the court had to disagree. Sometimes we affirm, even though
2 See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology's Uncertainty Principle,
54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 691 (2004).
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we might have ruled the other way or voted the other way had we
been the trial judge or member of the jury for that matter.
The most important thing I have to suggest to you refers back
to my flying analogy: If you cannot navigate by the electronic bea-
cons on the ground, or by the satellites, then the stars are your de-
fault tools for navigation. Furthermore, the best way to navigate
by the stars is not by individual stars, but by constellations. This
imagery is useful because no one case gives the whole picture, or
the proper directions. For example, Vitronics3 is not the definitive
total treatise on claim construction, even if I was the author.
This principle is very important to remember, particularly be-
cause we all tend to focus on the latest case, which typically re-
ceives a huge amount of attention. That one case may or may not
give some sense of what the next case may add by way of nuance.
Often that one case is not read in the context of the two or five or
eight or ten related cases, the "prelude" cases; consequently, the
overall guidance is lost.
I want to discuss topics broached by the district judges.4 Each
time I contribute to a symposium or participate as a member of the
audience at a conference and hear my brothers and sisters on the
district court speak, I walk away with absolute confidence that this
really is a great country, and we have a very good court system.
The architecture of the Constitution set out some very good basic
ideas to promote independence. The most important thing is that
we have nearly seven hundred men and women in this country sit-
ting as district judges and handling patent and other important dis-
putes. As you can easily see from the judges participating in this
symposium, they are exceptionally capable and bright and hugely
engaged in their work.
One question another participant raised is why the reversal
rate is so high for patent cases.5 I do not know what the reversal
rate is. The last figure I looked at for reversal of district court pat-
ent cases, on all issues, was thirty-two percent. My feeling is the
reversal rate for claim construction alone has to be less than that
figure, somewhere just shy of thirty percent. The average reversal
rate in our court is in the low twenties. If we reverse twenty per-
cent of the cases, but the reversal rate for patent claim construction
issues is thirty percent, an eyebrow, or perhaps two, is raised. But
3 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
4 See The Honorable Kathleen O'Malley, et al., A Panel Discussion: Claim Construction
from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671 (2004).
I Id. at 680-83.
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I doubt these figures signal a crisis or that the system is terribly
sick. Consequently, we must keep this issue in perspective.
Assuming the reversal rate on all issues is approximately
twenty percent, the next question is: What about the de novo issues
such as statutory construction? I do not know what the reversal
rate is for those issues, and our computer does not keep track of
that information. My guess is that the reversal rate for de novo
issues in general is higher than the average. For example, perhaps
the reversal rate for claim construction is thirty or thirty-five per-
cent.6
The other authors mentioned many possible causes for this re-
versal rate.7 Without discounting the power of any of the causes
mentioned before, I suggest an additional cause: the procedures in
place at the Patent and Trademark Office. It may not be too cyni-
cal to suggest that patent prosecutors strive for the broadest cover-
age possible, while putting off other considerations until later.
Narrower claims will almost always survive challenges, even if the
broader claims do not. The doctrine of equivalents is also a back-
ground consideration. Ambiguous wording may create an elastic-
ity in the claims. In general, there is a great deal of incentive to be
deliberately broad, and even to be deliberately ambiguous. On the
other hand, the patent examiner does not have much incentive to
fight back given the limited time and energy available.
The system basically gives us patents that are deliberately,
unavoidably, or in fact, very broad-often over-broad-and
somewhat vague and ambiguous in the wording. When these fac-
tors are taken into account, a reversal rate of claim construction
even in the range of thirty percent may be of some interest, or per-
haps even some concern, but it is not a crisis. Furthermore, it may
be the case that the reversal rate has come down significantly since
the years right after Markman.8
It concerns me greatly to learn that district judges sometimes
feel demoralized. We should be very careful in the labels we use.
Even though we, as judges, review claim construction de novo, de
novo may not the best label to use because it does not represent
what we really do. We do not analyze a claim construction from
scratch-not only should we not, we really cannot. Even if we
could and should, I doubt whether, even starting from scratch, we
6 These numbers may be high, but I would suggest they are not hugely out of line.
7 See O'Malley, supra note 5, at 680-83.
8 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (discussing a patent in-
fringement where the trial court granted judgment as a matter of law for the respondent, despite
the jury finding an infringement; the Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court and the Supreme
Court affirmed the Federal Circuit).
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could do it better than most of the district judges. This begs the
question that if what we do is not quite de novo, what is it?
First, I read the district judge's opinion on the claim construc-
tion to find out what his interpretation was and how the judge got
there. If it is convincing and is not contradicted by something that
is clearly stated in the claims, specification, prosecution history, or
other such sources, I am highly inclined to affirm. The three other
judges participating in this Symposium are certainly prime exam-
ples of judges who write very, very carefully and in detail about
how they reach their decision on claim construction. These judges
probably have a much lower reversal rate than other judges. Re-
view is really not de novo after all. It is unfortunate that there is
no label in between de novo and clear error review. Functionally,
claim construction falls in this middle ground.
Earlier, I was touting the value to people like me of hearing
commentary, discussion, and dialogue from district judges, practi-
tioners, and academics. There is, in addition to those very useful
sources, a new level of debate coming into view. Very large gov-
ernmental organizations are speaking out on a broad analytic level
about what is right and what is suboptimal in the patent system.
Recently the Federal Trade Commission issued a 315-page re-
port of very serious scholarship, with more footnotes than the Yale
Law Journal. 9 This year, the National Academy of Sciences issued
its report, which, similar to the FTC report, had a two-year gesta-
tion period.10 Sometime in the spring, the Department of Justice's
Antitrust Division will issue a counterpart report. Some of the
other alphabet-soup organizations, including the Intellectual Prop-
erty Owners (IPO), American Intellectual Property Law Associa-
tion (AIPLA), and the American Bar Association (ABA), may also
issue reports that in some way will be responsive to earlier reports.
The result is an escalating dialogue that includes various scholarly
(and lengthy) reports by government agencies.1 " With this in
mind, we are in for a very, very interesting year.
9 U.S. FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (Oct. 2003), available at http:/www.ftc.govlosl
2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
10 A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., Nat'l Acads.
Press, final version forthcoming 2004), prepublication version available at http://www.nap.edu/
books/0309089107/html/.
" I like full participation and applaud all this. Much good will probably come out of it,
particularly if all of the voices are heard. However, I would not give any one organization any
kind of supreme authority or veto power, including the Federal Circuit.
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II. INTERNAL WORKINGS
I joined the court in 1988, at which time we had twelve
judges, as there are now. In 1988 we had 217 patent cases pend-
ing; today we have 430 patent cases pending. Also, in the inter-
vening years since 1988, the difficulty of the average patent case
in our court has gone up at least one order of magnitude. Conse-
quently, we have the same twelve people now doing a vastly larger
amount of work on vastly harder cases. While this is not an ex-
cuse and it does not explain anything, it gives insight into the insti-
tution itself, and what is going on inside the institution.
In the Federal Circuit's first five or seven years, a great
amount of effort was directed at trying to undo some not-so-great
law in certain other unidentified circuits. In addition, there was
some confusion that arose from Supreme Court decisions, in part
because there were very few patent decisions in the modern era
and in part because the decisions that existed were sometimes am-
biguous. Sometime in the late '80s,12 the focus shifted toward
evolving technologies and the need for greater clarity, coherence,
and predictability in the doctrine. In the years since, we have fo-
cused increasingly on those kinds of considerations.
Currently, we have an enormously diverse court. We have
two former patent examiners, two former trial judges, and one
former academic. Some judges have extensive training in science
and technology. For instance, two are highly trained electronics
people, and two are Ph.D. chemists. We also have people like me
whose scientific or engineering training is negligible. The court
may benefit by having some district judges with considerable ex-
perience presiding over patent cases, which is one archetype not
found among our current twelve.13
There are a few things about the way our court operates that
are worth mentioning. First, each panel is randomly assembled,
and cases are randomly assigned to panels. The presiding judge on
the panel is the senior-most judge in "active service." These fac-
tors are not subject to manipulation. Of course, as a result we do
not have any specialization. If we get a big chemical case, we do
not mandate Judge Alan. D. Lourie 14 or Judge Pauline Newman1
5
take that case because they have a Ph.D. in chemistry. Instead,
everybody gets a representative sample of everything-the tech-
'2 By mere coincidence, this was about the time I joined the court.
13 If the President, any President, were listening to me, I would tell him to appoint a cou-
ple of district judges. Of course, the President does not listen to me, and no President does.
14 United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
15 United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
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nology and the contract cases, the trade cases, or the other dozen
areas we have. This is one fact about our court that is worth re-
membering.
It is difficult to judge the intensity of the debate among our
court members by what you can read in F.3d, or the computer
equivalent. It is like the proverbial iceberg: Only the top one-third
is visible. The two-thirds that is not visible is the extensive memo
traffic we fire back and forth at one another. Every opinion goes
through several stages and garners input from panel members and
non-panel members. It is a very vigorous process, and the debate
is enormously robust. I tell my non-lawyer friends and neighbors
that being an appellate judge has turned out to be a contact sport,
like boxing, rugby, or football, because we have very bruising dia-
logue. The process keeps everybody better informed and on their
toes, and everybody is checking everybody else all the time.'
6
The fact that we often consider rehearing cases en banc before
a decision is rendered generates a great deal of traffic back and
forth. Conversely, even after an opinion is issued, there is a peti-
tion for rehearing en banc in nearly every patent case. As a result,
the case then goes through the same process all over again. In be-
tween, there is, in addition to the panel members and non-panel
members, a central staff that checks every precedential opinion
against every prior opinion discussing the same issues. This repre-
sents our attempt to minimize the risk of appearing to change the
law when we are not intending to do so, or adding what we call
"confusion" to a particular area of the law.
We do not randomly decide who writes an opinion. It is tech-
nically the assignment of the presiding judge. In practice it is a
consensus decision ninety percent of the time. It tends to reflect a
number of different factors: Who does not have much of a back-
log? Who knows the technology better than somebody else? Who
has written on a given issue recently, or has done a lot of research
about it? Anybody with a leg up is more likely to be the author;
anybody with a handicap, backlog, or illness, is less likely to be
the author.
When formulating a position, we juggle a number of factors
and make decisions quite rapidly. Our conferences on cases are
held the very same day as the oral argument. We decide result,
rationale, type of opinion, author, which issues have to be reached,
and which can be skipped, virtually in every case. The process
goes quite quickly-three, four, or five minutes per case.
16 It is important to reiterate that outside commentators further contribute to the debate.
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In deciding whether to take a case en banc, more-versus-less
is not the key consideration. The key consideration is whether we
are taking the right cases en banc. There is nothing particularly
wrong with requiring seven out of twelve judges approving if you
are going to overrule a prior holding-that really is not the prob-
lem. Again, the petitions for en banc rehearing are often not much
better written than petitions for discretionary pretrial review under
section 1292(b),' 7 which limits our exercise of discretion. The im-
portant thing is to take the right cases en banc, without fear or fa-
vor, and to do so promptly and with a certain amount of courage.' 8
En banc is a very important part of our process and we spend
a great deal of time and energy on it. There is not any reticence to
rehear en banc. Occasionally, after we start to go en banc, we
back off because we realize that the record and the issues as adju-
dicated below really do not squarely present the issue that seems
so ripe for a conflict resolution, or resolution of a question of ex-
ceptional importance. We give an enormous amount of attention
to this on a case-by-case basis. We are very conscious of our role
as a nationwide court, and the need of practitioners in industry and
in law firms everywhere for maximum predictive power. We
know that some of our cases seem to be in tension with other
cases, or seem to use confusingly different verbalization. Some-
times doctrine shifts. A great many things that are alleged to be
conflicts are conflicts only at the most superficial and linguistic or
dicta level. There are, however, circumstances where there is a
real conflict. I often vote to go en banc when we get maybe four,
five, or six, not seven votes. When that happens, I am disap-
pointed, but I wait for the next time when we may get seven.
I mention these things not to say that there should not perhaps
be additional mechanisms put in place-maybe there should. The
point is to recognize that we have a lot of things in place to pre-
vent confusion and promote conformity. These checks help mini-
mize problems and reaffirm the fact that we watch such things
with great intensity.
I am often fascinated to read about the latest trend by the
court, or that the court decided to do X, Y, or Z, or the court seems
to believe A, B, or C. We have a meeting once a month, and our
discussion of philosophy or content or doctrine at the monthly
meeting is zero-we only discuss housekeeping. We do not have
meetings to discuss whether we are going to rein in the doctrine of
equivalents. We are as busy as we can possibly be simply decid-
17 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000).
'8 Importantly, this includes admitting when we are wrong.
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ing the cases, explaining the grounds of our decision, and trying to
determine where there is an opportunity to clarify the law or to
develop it, albeit cautiously. We really do not have an agenda;
actually, it would be very difficult and undesirable to have an
agenda.
Part of not having an agenda means that we have never taken
a position as an institution that we simply will not grant a section
1292(b) discretionary interlocutory (nonsummary judgment) ap-
peal from a Markman ruling. We might, which begs the question,
"When?" We will do so when we get a convincing reason stated in
the petition. I have ruled on quite a number of these petitions, and
I think a fair and frank assessment would be the reasons given
were pretty pathetic. If good reasons were given, we might well
do it.
Professor Craig Nard 19 challenged me to think of a kind of
case in which we might grant such a motion. We might hear an
interlocutory appeal in a case where the claim construction looks
like it is wrong. We might also grant an interlocutory appeal in a
case where, if the claim had been read differently, there definitely
would have been a grant of a summary judgment and a pretrial ap-
peal. In such a case, because the claim construction went wrong, a
motion for summary judgment was denied that otherwise would
have been granted. In such a case, without granting the appeal,
there will be a very expensive trial, only to perhaps have to do it
all over again, as Judge Patti Saris 20 reminded us. 21
The same holds true with many of other things that people
suggest we might want to consider doing. For example, our ability
to modulate notions of the ordinary skill in the art as of a given
time is limited by the record. Indeed, judges are limited generally
by the record on appeal: We are not supposed to go fishing for ex-
traneous sources unbeknownst to the lawyers who tried the case,
not to mention the district judge who adjudicated the case. This
limitation is both limiting and liberating because it means that in
some future case with a better record, we can have a better sense
of the issue.
In terms of what percentage of the appeals come from sum-
mary judgments or actions taken short of trial versus result after
full trial, let me use myself as the bookend. In 1988, fewer than
one-fifth of our district court patent appeals were from summary
19 Professor of Law and Director for Law, Technology, and the Arts, Case Western Re-
serve University School of Law.
20 United States District Court, District of Massachusetts.
21 See O'Malley, supra note 5, at 681-82.
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judgment. Today, it is more than three-quarters, and almost al-
ways it is summary judgment of non-infringement. Additionally,
almost always it is entirely clear that if the claim construction is
right, non-infringement is the correct answer.
It is very, very rare for a case to be at risk for reversal on the
basis of jury instructions. It is also very, very rare to have cases at
risk for reversal because of what some people, through repetition
of lore rather than careful attention to the holding, might tell us is
the law. For example, I am told that Vitronics 22 (I am sensitive to
that since I am the author) stands for the proposition that the dis-
trict judge may not look at extrinsic evidence, or at least may not
do so without first declaring there is hopeless ambiguity in the
claim. I have reread Vitronics many times, and that certainly is not
in the holding, and I cannot find it in dicta, either.
In terms of a case's "feel," as opposed to what the case says,
there may be a bit of feel in Vitronics that one should be cautious
about extrinsic evidence. The question then focuses on the rever-
sal rate of district judges for allowing in extrinsic evidence. The
answer is zero; we have never reversed a district judge since
Markman for admitting any extrinsic evidence they thought might
be admissible or appropriate. Furthermore, we do not reverse dis-
trict judges for relying on extrinsic evidence unless it is relied on
to utterly contradict clear meaning contained in the intrinsic record
(a rare occurrence).
Vitronics, to my reading, does not stand for the proposition
for which it is commonly cited. I use it as an example because it is
very tricky to understand all of the intersecting patent doctrines,
standards, and rules, even with perfect assessment of the individ-
ual decision's precedential force. If we engage in chasing dicta,
then we unnecessarily compound our difficulty.
Some claim that because of the structure of patent cases, a
non-infringement case is over if we grant summary judgment at the
trial court, but that if we grant summary judgment in the other di-
rection, we will likely have a trial on validity. In response, if the
suggestion is that I speculate that district judges are finding non-
infringement only to get the case up on appeal, I disagree. District
judges are very disciplined people. The Court of Appeals judges
are also very self-disciplined people. That is the nature of the job.
Judge Kathleen O'Malley 23 is exactly right.2 4 You wish you
could grant a summary judgment to get the case up on appeal, but
22 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
23 United States District Court, Northern District of Ohio.
24 See O'Malley, supra note 5, at 687.
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you do not do it because you know you are not allowed. There is
no indication that summary judgments are being granted when they
should not be because a judge is dying to get the case up on ap-
peal. There are some situations where the patentees will make a
concession, or defendants will drop invalidity challenges. That
situation is different because parties should be free to do anything
that is not un-American, fattening, or felonious.
Finally, in reference to the issue of dicta, some suggest that
one potential problem that could be generating some frustration
among district courts and observers is that perhaps the Federal
Circuit is writing too much. As a result, they argue the court
should be doing many more Rule 36 affirmances or some sort of
non-precedential one-line reversals to avoid having to plow the
same ground repeatedly.
I disagree. We have to write more carefully perhaps, but not
write less. We owe the bar, the district courts, the Patent Office,
and anybody else interested, coherent explanations of why we
ruled the way we did. We must do this for several reasons: credi-
bility of the courts, development of law, clarification of the law,
and predictive power. There are many opinions that have trou-
bling dicta, and I am bothered by some of the same statements that
bother the other Symposium participants. In the end, however, I
have the confidence that the next decision does not need to be un-
duly straight-jacketed by the troubling dicta because it is just
that-dicta. With this in mind, in the end, we have tremendous
potential to make course corrections as we fly the airplane.
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